Why Iran Is Courting India Inside the BRICS Parliamentary Forum

Why Iran Is Courting India Inside the BRICS Parliamentary Forum

When an Iranian parliamentary delegation praised India as a country with incredible potential and extended a formal invitation to Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla to visit Tehran during the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, diplomatic observers saw far more than routine legislative courtesy. The exchange reflects an urgent strategic calculation by Tehran to deepen institutional ties with New Delhi, using multilateral parliamentary platforms to bypass Western diplomatic isolation, accelerate connectivity projects like the Chabahar Port, and balance competing pressures within an expanding BRICS bloc.

Diplomatic niceties rarely happen by accident. In the world of international legislatures, compliments about potential and invitations to state capitals are currency. They are deployed when executive branches face friction, sanctions, or geopolitical headwinds that make traditional bilateral summits too visible or politically costly.

By targeting the Indian Parliament directly, Iran is signaling that its relationship with New Delhi transcends temporary shifts in global oil markets or Western sanctions regimes. Yet beneath the warm rhetoric lies a complex web of stalled infrastructure, divergent foreign policy priorities, and the realities of how India manages its simultaneous partnerships with Washington, Moscow, and Tehran.

The Strategic Reality Behind Parliamentary Diplomacy

Parliamentary diplomacy operates in a quieter, less scrutinized lane than executive statecraft. When foreign ministers or heads of state meet, every handshake is parsed by intelligence agencies, financial markets, and rival capitals. Speakers of parliament, by contrast, carry significant constitutional weight without triggering the immediate geopolitical alarms associated with defense or energy ministers.

According to reports from the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, the Iranian delegation specifically highlighted India's economic and geopolitical trajectory while inviting Om Birla to Tehran. For Iran, which officially joined BRICS as a full member in January 2024 alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, these forums are lifelines. They offer a legitimizing stage where Tehran is treated not as an isolated pariah under heavy United States and European sanctions, but as an equal stakeholder in shaping a multipolar world order.

India occupies a unique position in this architecture. Unlike Russia or China, whose postures toward the West are overtly adversarial, New Delhi maintains deep strategic, technological, and defense ties with the United States and Europe while remaining a founding pillar of BRICS. For Iranian lawmakers, winning influence in New Delhi means securing a bridge to the broader Global South and ensuring that BRICS does not tilt entirely into a Beijing-dominated orbit.

The invitation to Om Birla serves a dual purpose. First, it institutionalizes dialogue between the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran and the Parliament of India, creating a channel that persists regardless of immediate executive hurdles. Second, it places pressure on New Delhi to reciprocate high-level engagement at a time when India has had to walk a careful tightrope in West Asia.

What Iran Actually Wants From New Delhi

Strip away the diplomatic phrasing about incredible potential, and Tehran's objectives regarding India come down to three concrete pillars: connectivity, trade normalization, and geopolitical insulation.

The Chabahar Port Bottleneck

At the center of Indo-Iranian relations sits the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar Port on Iran's southeastern coast. For India, Chabahar is a geographic necessity. Denied overland transit access through Pakistan, New Delhi relies on Chabahar to reach Afghanistan and landlocked Central Asian markets without crossing Pakistani territory.

For Iran, Indian investment in Chabahar is both an economic lifeline for its underdeveloped Sistan and Baluchestan province and a strategic hedge. In May 2024, India and Iran signed a landmark 10-year agreement allowing India Ports Global Limited to operate the terminal. However, the shadow of American secondary sanctions continuously complicates financing, equipment procurement, and shipping insurance.

By praising India's potential at the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, Iranian representatives are subtly reminding New Delhi that realizing that potential requires follow-through on regional connectivity. Tehran wants Indian capital and logistical volume flowing through Chabahar and up into the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer multi-modal network linking India to Russia via Iran.

Escaping the Sanctions Squeeze

Before U.S. sanctions tightened in 2018 and 2019, India was one of Iran's largest buyers of crude oil. New Delhi zeroed out Iranian oil imports to comply with American demands and preserve its broader strategic relationship with Washington. Bilateral trade collapsed from over $17 billion in 2018–2019 to roughly $2 billion in subsequent years, consisting largely of Indian agricultural exports like basmati rice, tea, and pharmaceuticals traded through complex rupee-rial settlement mechanisms.

Iran views BRICS as an incubator for alternative financial mechanisms that could eventually shield bilateral trade from the U.S. dollar. While a single BRICS currency remains a distant, technically fraught concept, local currency settlement systems and cross-border payment messaging alternatives are actively discussed on the sidelines of BRICS gatherings. Engaging Indian lawmakers helps build legislative backing in New Delhi for expanding non-dollar trade channels.

Counterbalancing China's Footprint

A frequently overlooked factor in Tehran's outreach to India is Iran's desire to avoid total economic dependence on Beijing. In 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement, and China remains the primary buyer of discounted Iranian crude. Yet Iranian policymakers and lawmakers are historically wary of relying on a single great power.

India offers a natural counterweight. Culturally, historically, and geographically, India and Iran share centuries of interaction. By elevating India as a partner of immense potential, Tehran signals to both Beijing and domestic Iranian constituencies that it retains multiple strategic options in Asia.

Why India Plays a Cautious Game

If Iran is eager to accelerate ties, why does New Delhi maintain a measured, deliberate pace? The answer lies in India's doctrine of multi-alignment—the practice of pursuing issue-based partnerships with competing global powers without entering formal alliances.

India's foreign policy establishment views Iran as vital for regional stability, counter-terrorism intelligence sharing, and Eurasian transit. Yet New Delhi also maintains robust defense, intelligence, and technology partnerships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, alongside its deepening security cooperation with the United States.

When Iranian officials extend invitations to senior Indian figures like Om Birla, the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi weighs the optics carefully. A high-profile visit to Tehran carries diplomatic weight. It reassures Iran of India's commitment to bilateral ties, yet it must be calibrated so it does not undermine India's broader economic and security interests in the Persian Gulf or trigger friction with Western partners over sanctions compliance.

Furthermore, Indian policymakers remain pragmatic about Iran's internal constraints. Bureaucratic delays within Iran, shifting regulatory frameworks, and persistent regional instability in the Middle East have repeatedly slowed down joint projects. Praise from a parliamentary delegation does not automatically clear customs bottlenecks or resolve banking compliance hurdles in Mumbai and Tehran.

The Evolution of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum

To understand why this specific exchange happened at the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, one must look at how the institution itself has evolved. Originally conceived as a consultative gathering of legislative leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, the forum has expanded significantly alongside the broader BRICS grouping.

With the addition of new members like Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE, the BRICS Parliamentary Forum now represents nearly half the world's population. Its stated mandate is to strengthen legislative cooperation, share governance practices, and support the decisions taken by BRICS heads of state at annual summits.

In practice, the forum functions as a diplomatic testing ground. Ideas that might be too sensitive for formal intergovernmental treaties are floated in parliamentary committees. Bilateral meetings held on the margins of the forum allow delegations to reset strained relationships or float trial balloons.

For Om Birla, presiding over India's Lok Sabha—the lower house of the world's largest democracy—gives him substantial standing at these gatherings. Indian parliamentary delegations routinely emphasize democratic governance, digital public infrastructure, and Global South solidarity. When the Iranian delegation singled out India for praise, it was acknowledging New Delhi's clout as the preeminent democratic voice within an increasingly diverse bloc.

Historical Precedent and Institutional Memory

The current outreach mirrors earlier eras of Indo-Iranian diplomacy when legislative and cultural exchanges kept the relationship alive during periods of geopolitical freeze. In the early 2000s, following the New Delhi Declaration signed in 2003, India and Iran envisioned a strategic partnership spanning energy, defense, and transit.

Even as international disputes over Iran's nuclear program intensified over the ensuing two decades, parliamentary friendship groups in both New Delhi and Tehran continued to meet. Former Indian speakers and lawmakers periodically visited Tehran, maintaining an institutional memory that outlasted individual administrations.

History shows that these visits rarely produce immediate, headline-grabbing commercial contracts. Instead, they establish political cover. When bureaucrats in New Delhi or Tehran encounter deadlocks over port tariffs, visa regimes for business travelers, or phytosanitary standards for agricultural trade, high-level parliamentary goodwill provides the political mandate needed to unblock administrative files.

What Comes Next for Indo-Iranian Relations

An invitation to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha is an official diplomatic instrument, not a casual remark. Whether and when Om Birla travels to Tehran will depend on parliamentary calendars, regional security conditions in West Asia, and broader diplomatic sequencing by New Delhi.

If the visit materializes, observers should look past the ceremonial speeches and watch three specific indicators to gauge whether the relationship is moving beyond rhetoric:

  • Operational throughput at Chabahar: Actual cargo volumes moving through the Shahid Beheshti terminal and integration with rail links inside Iran toward Central Asia.
  • Payment mechanism expansion: Concrete steps by central banks and commercial lenders to facilitate rupee-based trade beyond basic humanitarian and agricultural goods.
  • Bilateral parliamentary working groups: The establishment of structured committees focused on trade facilitation, maritime security, and cultural exchanges rather than broad ideological statements.

Diplomacy between nations with diverging global alignments is rarely linear. Iran's praise for India's potential and its outreach to Om Birla underscore a fundamental geographic truth: regardless of global power shifts, India and Iran remain permanently linked by the Arabian Sea and the Eurasian landmass, forcing both capitals to keep talking even when the wider world pulls them in opposite directions.

PM

Penelope Martin

An enthusiastic storyteller, Penelope Martin captures the human element behind every headline, giving voice to perspectives often overlooked by mainstream media.